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The interpretation of the significant relation between business investment spending and
cash flow has been controversial. A large body of research has found that investment/cash
flow sensitivities are higher for financially constrained firms. This fundamental result un-
derlying the finance constraints hypothesis has been challenged recently by Kaplan, Zin-
gales, and Cleary. The latter author introduces an important new element to this debate by
using discriminant analysis, which allows creditworthy firms to be identified using an ob-
jective ex-ante criterion based on dividend payouts. Consistent with the Kaplan and Zin-
gales critique, investment/cash flow sensitivities are lower for financially constrained
firms. This short paper documents that the use of discriminant analysis does not necessarily
lead to lower sensitivities. Our contrasting results are traceable to the use of the firm’s
creditworthiness as the discriminating variable and appropriate adjustments for endogenous
regressors and serially correlated residuals. We document that the investment/cash flow
sensitivity is higher for financially constrained firms.
JEL Codes: G32, E22Zusammenfassung
Die Interpretation der signifikanten Beziehung zwischen unternehmerischen Investitions-
ausgaben und dem Cash-Flow ist umstritten. Eine größere Anzahl von Forschungsarbeiten
kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Sensitivität der Investitionen bezüglich des Cash-Flow
bei finanziell beschränkten Unternehmen höher liegt. Dieses für die Theorie finanzieller
Beschränkungen grundlegende Resultat wurde in jüngerer Zeit von Kaplan, Zingales und
Cleary in Zweifel gezogen. Der letztgenannte Autor führte ein wichtiges neues Element in
die Debatte ein: Finanziell beschränkte Unternehmen werden von ihm mit Hilfe eines
diskriminanzanalytischen Verfahrens identifiziert, also eines objektiven ex-ante Kriteri-
ums. Im Einklang mit der Kritik von Kaplan und Zingales findet er bei finanziell be-
schränkten Unternehmen eine geringere Cash-Flow-Sensitivität. Dieses kurze Papier do-
kumentiert, dass eine diskriminanzanalytische Vorgehensweise nicht notwendigerweise zu
einem derartigen Resultat führt. Unsere abweichenden Ergebnisse basieren einerseits auf
der Identifikation finanziell beschränkter Unternehmen auf der Basis ihrer Kreditwürdig-
keit, andererseits aber auf der Berücksichtigung endogener Regressoren und seriell korre-
lierter Residuen bei der Schätzung. Wir zeigen auf, dass die Cash-Flow-Sensitivität der In-
vestitionsausgaben bei finanziell beschränkten Unternehmen höher ist.
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Further Evidence On The Relationship Between
Firm Investment And Financial Status *)
Introduction
The impact of finance on firm’s investment decisions has been a hotly contested research
issue for decades. Since the earliest econometric studies by Tinbergen (1939), Klein
(1951), and Meyer and Kuh (1957), investment equations have frequently contained li-
quidity variables, and these regressors have usually been statistically significant. Despite
this and other empirical evidence, the framework of Modigliani and Miller (1958) that was
prominent through the mid-1980’s questioned the role and interpretation of such financial
variables. However, over the past 15 years, work on asymmetric information, costly moni-
toring, and transactions costs have provided a theoretical basis for the role of finance con-
straints.1
A flurry of empirical work has followed on these theoretical developments. In an important
paper, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (FHP, 1988) assess the finance constraints hypothe-
sis in terms of an investment equation that relates investment opportunities (Xi,t) and an in-
dicator of finance constraints (LIQi,t) in the following equation,2
Ii,t/Ki,t-1 = F[Xi,t] + G[LIQi,t] + ui,t,( 1 )
where Ii,t/Ki,t-1 is the investment/capital ratio for firm i at time t, F[.] and G[.] are functions
increasing in their arguments, and ui,t is a stochastic error term. FHP measure Xi,t by the
Brainard-Tobin’s Q (Qi,t) and LIQi,t by the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock
(CFi,t/Ki,t-1), and estimate the following model,
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1 See the reviews of the finance constraint literature by Gertler (1988), Schiantarelli (1995), and Hubbard
(1998).
2 See, for example, FHP (1988, equation 3) and Cleary (1999, equation 1).– 2 –
Ii,t/Ki,t-1 = α i + β  Qi,t + γ  CFi,t/Ki,t-1 + ui,t,( 2 )
where α i, β,  and γ   are estimated coefficients. There is some evidence of serial correlation
in the residuals from this specification.3
An important innovation in the FHP study was assessing the finance constraints hypothesis
in terms of the pattern of estimated coefficients across classes of firms. In their paper,
firms are sorted by the dividend payout ratio under the hypothesis that firms paying-out a
lower percentage of their equity income as dividends must face higher costs for external
funds. Thus, the γ   for low dividend payout firms should be statistically different from zero
and higher than the γ   for the high dividend payout and presumably unconstrained firms.
This approach, which has spawned a huge literature with data from different countries and
different sortings, tests the null hypothesis of a financially frictionless firm by the signifi-
cance of the γ 's, and uses their pattern across firms to suggest the alternative of finance
constraints.
The FHP paper has been recently criticized in a lively intellectual exchange. Kaplan and
Zingales (KZ, 1997) argue that the sorting criterion used by FHP was inappropriate, and
misclassified firms’ ability to obtain financing. They expand the information for classifying
firms by using annual and 10-K reports, public news, and management’s discussion of li-
quidity needs. With their classification, KZ rerun equation (2), and find the opposite result
from FHP for investment/cash flow sensitivities – the γ  for constrained firms is less than
the γ   for unconstrained firms. Schiantarelli (1995), Hubbard (1998), and FHP (2000) have
offered several arguments against the KZ approach. Chief among these are that some of the
additional information used by KZ is highly subjective and that the sample size of con-
strained firms is too small to support accurate inference. KZ (2000) offer a rejoinder.
Cleary (1999) introduces an important new element into this debate by using discriminant
analysis. He defines his reference groups as those firms that either increase or decrease
dividend payments. Firms that do not change their dividend payment are excluded. He then
computes a discriminant function based on several financial ratios, and uses this function
to divide his sample into three mutually exhaustive and exclusive classes – financially con-
strained, partially financially constrained, and not financially constrained. Cleary has a
large sample of 9,219 firm/year observations and, coupled with the use of objective ex-ante
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that lagged dependent and independent variables are important in their Q model.– 3 –
measures generated by the discriminant function, his study addresses the above two criti-
cisms of the KZ analysis. He estimates equation (2) by OLS, and his coefficient estimates
support the KZ finding that investment/cash flow sensitivities are lower for financially
constrained firms.
This short paper documents that the use of discriminant analysis does not necessarily lead
to the Cleary/Kaplan/Zingales (CKZ) finding; the initial FHP result concerning higher cash
flow sensitivity for financially constrained firms holds when these firms are identified by
means of a discriminant analysis. The differing results are traceable to three factors. First,
we use the firm’s creditworthiness in place of dividend payments as the discriminant vari-
able. There is rather broad agreement that variations in firm creditworthiness and the re-
sulting wedge between internal and external finance are the key elements in finance con-
straints models.4 We have available unique and confidential data from the Deutsche Bun-
desbank that allows us to generate a precise indicator of those firms that will face a pre-
mium on external finance. We believe that our creditworthiness measure allows for more
accurate inferences than is possible with the indirect measures used previously in the lit-
erature.5 Second, since the right-side variables in (1) or (2) are endogenous, obtaining con-
sistent coefficients requires the use of an instrumental variable estimator. Third, serially
correlated residuals may adversely affect inferences. We show that, relative to the preferred
Generalized Method Of Moments (GMM) estimator that adjusts for endogenous regressors
and serially correlated residuals, OLS biases the results toward the CKZ conclusion of
lower cash flow sensitivities for financially constrained firms.
In considering our contribution to the finance constraints debate, we believe it is important
to emphasize that, relative to Cleary, our OLS coefficient estimates are based on a different
specification with different data. We use data on German firms rather than US firms be-
cause of the availability of a creditworthiness measure that has been tested and developed
over several years. The econometric specification follows from equation (1) but, since we
wish to work with a very large sample in order to amplify the creditworthiness distinctions,
we need to include firms not listed on stock exchanges. Hence, a Q model is not feasible.
Nonetheless, despite these differences, we are able to reproduce the pattern and magnitude
of γ ’s obtained by Cleary with OLS. Our study proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the
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Cleary (1999, Abstract).
5 Identifying finance constrained firms by their dividend payout behavior was used in the original FHP study.
This classification scheme has been controversial because dividend policy may be associated with factors not
directly related to creditworthiness, such as investor taxation (Allen, Bernardo, and Welch, 2000), firm matu-
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model specification and several econometric issues. We estimate a distributed lag (DL)
model that includes current and lagged percentage changes in sales and user cost and the
current and lagged cash flow/capital ratio. Section II discusses the unique dataset available
for this study, and the discriminant analysis that allows us to sort the data to assess the fi-
nance constraints hypothesis. Section III contains our OLS results for the creditworthiness
ratio and, like CKZ, we find that investment/cash flow sensitivities are lower for finan-
cially constrained firms. However, given the endogeneity of the regressors, these OLS re-
sults may be biased, and Section IV presents GMM results for the exact same distributed
lag model used in Section III. In this case, the cash flow coefficients for constrained and
unconstrained firms are not significantly different. Both the GMM and OLS estimates of
this DL model appear to be questionable because serial correlation tests suggest that the
econometric specification does not provide a satisfactory representation of the dynamic
structure of investment. We thus add lagged dependent variables. In this autoregressive
distributed lag (ADL) model, we find a marked improvement in model specification and, as
in the initial FHP analysis, that investment/cash flow sensitivities are higher for financially
constrained firms. Section V contains conclusions.
I. Estimating Equation
Our econometric equation is similar to the model (equation (1)) used frequently in the lit-
erature examining finance constraints, and contains separate terms capturing investment
opportunities and financial effects. Investment opportunities are measured by Cleary by the
market-to-book ratio, a procedure requiring that all firms are listed on a stock exchange.
However, to expand the coverage of firms, our dataset also includes non-listed firms. In-
vestment opportunities are specified using the neoclassical theory of capital accumulation,
which excludes financing effects. In this model, the desired capital stock is related to a
quantity variable (sales, S) and a price variable (the user cost of capital, UC, discussed in
Section II.B). This demand for the stock of capital is translated into a demand for the flow
of investment by relating the percentage change in capital (or the investment/capital ratio
less depreciation, I/K - δ ) to current and lagged percentage changes in S and UC. These lag
coefficients represent in an unrestricted manner expectations formation and adjustment
frictions. (The model can be further generalized by including lagged dependent variables;
this extension will be considered in Section IV.B.) The second element in equation (1)
concerns the specification of the liquidity variable. As in many studies, we measure fi-
nancing effects by the ratio of cash flow to the capital stock (CF/K), and capture fixed firm
and time effects with firm-specific (α i)  and time-specific (α t) intercepts. These considera-
tions give rise to the following distributed lag investment specification (DL(H)) of lag
length H:– 5 –
                                                     H                                       H
Ii,t/Ki,t-1  =  α i   +   α t   -    Σ   β uc,h ∆ logUCi,t-h     +     Σ   β s,h ∆ logSi,t-h     
                                               h=0                                   h=0
                   H
            +   Σ   γ h (CFi,t-h / Ki,t-1-h)    +   ui,t ,  (3)
                           h=0
where the α ’s, β ’s, and γ ’s are estimated coefficients, ui,t is a stochastic error term, i in-
dexes firms, and t indexes time. The other coefficients do not vary across firms. Equation
(3) is derived in Appendix A.6
The key test for assessing the importance of finance constraints is whether there exists a
differential effect of cash flow on investment for constrained firms relative to uncon-
strained firms. We evaluate this test by estimating jointly a set of coefficients for uncon-
strained firms and a set of differential coefficients between contrasting classes of firms.7
For example, consider the coefficient on the contemporaneous cash flow term. In our esti-
mating equation, we replace γ 0 in (3) by γ 0 + γ ∆, 0 * DFCi , where the latter term is an indi-
cator variable equaling one for firms classified as financially constrained and zero for the
contrasting class of unconstrained firms. The estimating equation used in this study is as
follows,
                                                     H        
Ii,t/Ki,t-1  =  α i   +   α t   –    Σ   (β uc,h + β ∆ ,uc,h*DFCi) * ∆ logUCi,t-h
                                                    h=0         
                                          H        
                                    +    Σ   (β s,h + β ∆ ,s,h*DFCi) * ∆ logSi,t-h      (4)
                                         h=0         
                                          H        
                                    +    Σ   (γ h + γ ∆ ,h*DFCi) * (CFi,t-h / Ki,t-1-h)    +   ui,t .
                                         h=0       
This joint approach with the full sample allows us to evaluate in a relatively straightfor-
ward manner the differential effect of cash flow in terms of a t-test on the estimated γ ∆ ,h’s.
Furthermore, these tests incorporate the covariances among coefficients for constrained and
unconstrained firms (e.g., the covariance between γ 0  and γ ∆, 0). Since our estimating equa-
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model.
7 A similar approach has been used by Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) and Chirinko and Schaller (1995).– 6 –
tion contains both current and lagged values of cash flow, the test is based on the sum of
the differential coefficients,
                 H
η    =     Σ    γ ∆ ,h .( 5 )
               h=0
If η  is negative and statistically significant, we obtain the CKZ result that financially con-
strained firms are less sensitive to cash flow. By contrast, a value of η  that is positive and
statistically significant is consistent with the original FHP finding that financially con-
strained firms are more sensitive to cash flow.
II. Datasets
A. Creditworthiness Ratio (CWR)
A unique element in this study is the set of creditworthiness ratios (CWR’s) generated by
the Bundesbank in performing its rediscounting and lending operations. Bills of exchange
are issued by nonfinancial firms, and were frequently presented to the Bundesbank by
credit institutions.8 When a bill was presented for discounting, the creditworthiness of the
issuing firm, as well as all other firms that have held this bill, needed to be determined. In
the case of default, liability for payment of the bill falls on any firm that has held the bill.
By law, the Bundesbank could only accept bills backed by three parties known to be cred-
itworthy.
The Bundesbank evaluates firms by undertaking a massive effort at collecting financial
statement data (discussed in Section II.C) and computing CWR’s (Gesamtkennzahl) using
discriminant analysis.9 The two underlying populations are solvent and insolvent firms,
where insolvency is indicated by a legal application for bankruptcy. The sample is con-
structed by first identifying the relatively scarce insolvent firms, and then adding a solvent
firm from the same sector. To enhance the statistical properties of the discriminant func-
tion, the sample contains an equal number of solvent and insolvent firms. The following in-
formation is used to compute the discriminant function: 1) equity/pension provision ratio
                                                
8 Since the implementation of the Monetary Union on January 1, 1999, the Bundesbank continues to assess
creditworthiness in the course of the Eurosystem monetary policy operations, but it no longer rediscounts
trade bills.
9 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1999) for further details about the construction of the CWR’s and the credit
evaluation process.– 7 –
(adjusted equity capital and pension provisions as a percentage of total capital employed;
2) return on total capital employed (profit before income taxes and before interest pay-
ments as a percentage of total capital employed); 3) return on equity (profit before income
taxes as a percentage of adjusted equity income); 4) capital recovery rate (net receipts as a
percentage of capital invested); 5) net interest payment ratio (net interest as a percentage of
turnover); 6) accounting practice (which affects available valuation methods). The weights
assigned to these categories are confidential. These ratios are examined by the Bundes-
bank’s Department of Credit, Foreign Exchange, and Financial Markets for outliers. The
original CWR’s range between -99.9 and 99.9, and have been transformed for this study to
vary between 0 and 1.
The discriminant analysis determines two critical values of the CWR that classifies firms
into one of three categories: high degree of creditworthiness (Good), low degree of credit-
worthiness (Endangered), or indeterminate. The proportion of distressed firms in the data
used in the discriminant analysis appears representative, and compares favorably to the
percentage of failed firms in the overall economy (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998; Stoess,
2001).
B. User Cost (UC)
The user cost of capital (UC) measures the price of capital, and is comprised of three com-
ponents,
UC = R * P * T, (6)
where R, P, and T represent rental, price, and tax terms, respectively. The rental term con-
tains two components, the opportunity cost of funds measured by the real long-term interest
rate (r = i - π,  the nominal discount rate (i)  less the expected rate of inflation (π ) in the price
of investment goods) and the economic rate of depreciation (δ ). The P term is the price of
investment goods relative to the price of output. The two key taxes are the rate of income
taxation (reflecting both federal and Länder rates, as well as the “solidarity surcharge”) and
the present value of the stream of current and future tax depreciation deductions. The user
cost variable used in this study is much more complicated than this discussion reveals, and
these important details are discussed in Appendix B.– 8 –
C. Financial Statements (UBS)
The Bundesbank’s financial statement database (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik, UBS) con-
stitutes the largest source of accounting data for nonfinancial firms in Germany.10 About
70,000 annual accounts were collected per year on a strictly confidential basis by the Bun-
desbank’s branch offices. These data were initially subjected to a computer check for logi-
cal errors and missing data. Approximately 15,000 accounts had to be excluded because
they were incomplete, represented consolidated accounts, or were for firms in sectors (e.g.,
agriculture) for which no meaningful results could be generated owing to the small amount
of available data. Additional checks and corrections for errors were undertaken in the Sta-
tistical Department at the Bundesbank’s Central Office in Frankfurt before finalizing the
UBS database.
The dataset used in estimation is smaller for several reasons. We use data only for firms lo-
cated in the manufacturing sector of West Germany to avoid any issues of comparability
between the western and eastern sections of the country. Sole proprietorships and private
partnerships are excluded because their tax treatment depends on personal characteristics
that are very difficult to quantify. State dominated corporations are also excluded. The da-
taset is further reduced by missing values, data cleaning, variable construction involving
lags, and outlier control.11 The data extend from 1988 to 1997.12 We thus have available
for our preferred econometric specification containing three lags (equation (4) with H=3)
44,345 datapoints for 6,408 firms. For 1996, these data represent 42% of the total turnover
of the West German manufacturing sector and 61% of the total turnover of incorporated
firms in all German manufacturing.
D. Summary Statistics
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables that will enter the econometric speci-
fication; variable definitions are displayed in the table note. In addition, the variable means
for the sub-sample defined by CWR are presented in columns 6-8. A noteworthy feature of
                                                
10 This discussion draws on the Deutsche Bundesbank (1998) and Stoess  (2001), which contain more detai-
led descriptions of the UBS data.
11 We control for outliers by discarding the upper and lower 1% tails of sales growth, cash flow divided by
the capital stock, and the CWR, and the upper 2% tail of the investment capital ratio.
12 The beginning year of 1988 is chosen because the definitions of many important financial statement varia-
bles were changed in 1986 by the directive harmonizing financial statements in the European Union. For
many firms, the changes were not instituted in 1987, and the amount of data available in the UBS is unaccep-
tably low in that year.– 9 –
the UBS dataset is the extensive coverage of small firms. Nearly one-half of the observa-
tions in the full sample are for firms with 100 employees or fewer.
III. OLS Estimates
This section presents results with the OLS estimation strategy used by Cleary. Firm fixed-
effects are removed by first-differencing.13 Since the focus of the analysis is on the sensi-
tivity of investment to cash flow, only the cash flow coefficients and standard errors are
presented in the tables. (Complete tables of the estimated coefficients are presented in Ap-
pendix C.) The first column of Table II contains results for the full sample and, as in virtu-
ally all investment equations, cash flows is statistically significant. Our sum of the cash
flow coefficients η  equals 0.137 with a standard error of 0.013.
The important issue dividing CKZ and FHP is the differential sensitivity of cash flow coef-
ficients. Rather than sorting firms by their predicted dividend payout policy as in Cleary,
we form sub-samples with a direct measure of the external finance premium, CWR. Firms
are sorted into three categories of creditworthiness – Endangered, Good, and Indeterminate
– depending on the state in the year before the investment/capital ratio first enters the re-
gression model as a dependent variable. Our large sample permits us to discard the middle
group to in order to sharpen the tests between the Endangered and Good firms.
The CWR split sample results confirm CKZ's findings. Estimates for the Good class of
firms and the differential between the Endangered and Good classes are presented in col-
umns 2 and 3 of Table II. The sum of coefficient differences between the Endangered and
Good firms is -0.066. This η  has a p-value of 0.059. Based on these OLS results, finan-
cially constrained firms are less sensitive to cash flow, a result that contradicts the findings
of FHP and many other published studies.
Our distributed lag model contains several insignificant coefficients that may affect the re-
ported standard errors and p-values for the estimated coefficient sums. To obtain more pre-
cise estimates, we retain only those regressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-
values are less than 0.10. This trimmed specification includes the current and once lagged
value of cash flow, the current and twice lagged value of the user cost, and the current and
thrice lagged values of sales. These trimmed estimates are presented in columns 4 and 5 of
                                                
13 In Cleary’s estimated models, the results are robust to whether firm fixed-effects are removed by mean-dif-
ferencing or first-differencing (Cleary, fn. 13). We choose the latter method because only a first-difference
transformation is appropriate for the GMM estimates to be presented in Section IV.– 10 –
Table II. For cash flow, the current and once lagged coefficient differences are each nega-
tive and statistically significant. Relative to the results in column 3, the key η  statistic rises
(in absolute value), and has a lower standard error. The null hypothesis of equality between
the sum of cash flow coefficient differences has a p-value of 0.000, again confirming the
CKZ finding. Interestingly, our η  of -0.082 is very similar to the comparable differential of
-0.089 reported in Cleary’s Table IV.
IV. GMM Estimates
The OLS estimates reported in Table II are subject to two potential problems concerning
the error term. First, there is a possible correlation between the error term and the regres-
sors.14 This endogeneity problem will lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates, and needs
to be addressed with an instrumental variables technique. Second, there is some evidence
that the residuals are serially correlated. With the First-Difference estimator, white noise
errors imply that the residuals for periods t and t-2 will be uncorrelated. We use the La-
grangian Multiplier statistic (LM(2)) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for assessing
second-order residual serial correlation. If the model is correctly specified and serially cor-
related residuals are absent, the p-value for LM(2) should be large. However, as indicated
in the bottom row of Table II, serial correlation is evident, and the specification may be
suspect. Moreover, serially correlated residuals will make it difficult to find appropriate in-
struments to correct the endogeneity problem. This section explores the impacts of endoge-
neity and serial correlation on the estimated coefficients and the inferences about finance
constraints.
A. Distributed Lag (DL) Specification
We begin by addressing the issue of endogeneity, but maintain the distributed lag specifi-
cation (equation 4). The standard approach to addressing endogeneity is to replace OLS
with an instrumental variables technique. We use the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) technique developed by Hansen (1982) and applied to panel data by Arellano and
Bond (1991). Apart from controlling for the distorting effects of endogeneity, the GMM
estimates also correct for conditional heteroscedasticity. We choose appropriately lagged
values of the right-hand variables as instruments: CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t),  ∆ logUCi,t-m(t), and
∆ logSi,t-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data availability and increases
over the sample. A constant and the time dummies are also in the instrument set.
                                                
14 This problem is addressed by Clearly, FHP, and other authors by using the beginning-of-period value of
Q. However, the key cash flow variable is defined over period t, and hence is likely to be endogenous.– 11 –
GMM estimates are presented in Table III, which has the exact same format as Table II. As
with OLS, the full sample results in column 1 indicate that cash flow is statistically signifi-
cant. However, each GMM cash flow coefficient is lower than its OLS counterpart. This
result suggests that the OLS results may be adversely affected by a positive correlation
between cash flow and shocks to investment spending, the latter captured in the error term.
The important change is that the η ’s in columns 3 and 5 are now positive. These results
imply that investment spending by Endangered firms is more sensitive to cash flow than
Good firms. However, the t-statistics are approximately one, and thus there is no statistical
grounds for rejecting the hypothesis of equality between the cash flow coefficients for
firms sorted by creditworthiness.
The specification of the DL model estimated by GMM is satisfactory in one dimension, but
remains unsatisfactory in another. For GMM estimation, Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982)
propose a statistic (SH) for testing overidentifying restrictions. If these restrictions on the
instruments are rejected, the p-value for the SH statistic will be small. For the split-sample
results, the p-values are in excess of 0.250, and the instruments appear to be valid. How-
ever, as in the OLS specification, the p-values for the LM(2) statistics are very close to
zero, thus indicating that serial correlation continues to be a problem.
B. Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) Specification
Serially correlated residuals are not uncommon in investment studies (cf. fn. 3), and may
reflect misspecified dynamics. In panel models using lagged endogenous regressors as in-
struments, serially correlated residuals will lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates. In
general, coefficients of lagged variables represent in an unrestricted manner expectations
formation and adjustment frictions, and including lags of the dependent variable is recom-
mended by the derivation in Appendix A to capture these dynamic effects. The ADL speci-
fication follows from equation (4) with the inclusion of an additional sum of lags of the
dependent variable – Σ h (λ h + λ ∆ ,h*DFCi) * (Ii,t-h / Ki,t-1-h), h=1,...,H. With these additional
terms, the η  statistic capturing the long-run impact of cash flow on investment equals the
formula in equation (5) divided by (1-Σ  λ h); standard errors for this nonlinear combination
of coefficients are computed by the delta method. Lastly, the instrument list now includes
lags of the dependent variable.
GMM estimates of the ADL specification are presented in Table IV. The inclusion of lags
of the dependent variable eliminates the serial correlation problem, as the p-values for the
LM(2) statistics rise sharply. The p-values for the SH statistic continue to exceed conven-– 12 –
tional levels of significance. The ADL specification has important implications for cash
flow sensitivities. As indicated in column 3, η  is positive with a p-value of 0.061.15 When
we remove the insignificant coefficients, η  does not change, but the standard error declines.
The resulting p-value falls to 0.032. Thus, the null hypothesis that the cash flow coeffi-
cients are equal for financially constrained and unconstrained firms is rejected, and the
original FHP result is confirmed.
V. Summary And Conclusions
That financial factors are related to business fixed investment is not in question. In many
investment equations for many different countries, cash flow and other variables repre-
senting financial structure are statistically and economically important. However, the inter-
pretation of this significant relation remains controversial. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen
(1998) ignited recent interest by introducing an innovative test that assessed the finance
constraints hypothesis in terms of the pattern of estimated coefficients across classes of
firms. The FHP paper has been the subject of recent criticisms by Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) that, in turn, has led to a series of counter-criticisms. Cleary (1999) addresses some
of the important concerns that have been raised by using discriminant analysis on a large
dataset.
This short paper presents evidence that the use of discriminant analysis does not necessar-
ily lead to the CKZ finding that cash flow sensitivities are lower for financially constrained
firms. Rather than using dividend payouts, we are able to base our discriminant analysis di-
rectly on the firm’s creditworthiness because of unique and confidential rating data at our
disposal. Furthermore, we account for the distorting effects on inferences due to endoge-
nous regressors and serially correlated residuals. Consistent with FHP’s original conclu-
sion, we find that firms that are financially constrained, as indicated by their creditworthi-
ness, have higher investment/cash flow sensitivities.
Our results confirm the benefits of using discriminant analysis or other formal techniques
for generating objective ex-ante measures for classifying financially constrained firms. The
econometric evidence presented here demonstrates the sensitivity of economic inferences
to econometric specifications. Additional empirical work is needed to pin-down the proper
conclusions to be drawn from investment/cash flow correlations.
                                                
15 This η  statistic is appropriate if, as we believe, misspecified dynamics are the source of serial correlation
in the residuals. If the serial correlation is due to serial correlation in the error term, then the original formu-
lation of η  in equation (5) would be appropriate.– 13 –
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Table I
Summary Statistics For The Full And Split Samples
                                        Full Sample                                         Split By Creditworthiness
                  (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)        (5)         (6)             (7)          (8)





It / Kt-1 0.1813 0.220 0.0585 0.1161 0.2157 0.1776 0.1891 0.1806
∆∆∆∆ logUCt 0.0222 0.0717 -0.0178 0.0094 0.0644 0.0217 0.0228 0.0222
UCt 0.1587 0.0183 0.1457 0.1572 0.1697 0.1584 0.1579 0.1589
∆∆∆∆ logSt 0.0206 0.1597 -0.0654 0.0214 0.1068 0.0111 0.0265 0.0218
St 173.15 1455.12 9.94 26.13 71.25 51.16 57.98 225.31
CFt / Kt-1 0.2843 0.4941 0.1091 0.1887 0.3308 0.1563 0.2262 0.3267
∆∆∆∆ CWRt 0.0004 0.0427 -0.0210 0.005 0.0220 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0007
CWRt 0.5736 0.0618 0.5355 0.5735 0.6150 0.5147 0.5399 0.5946
Notes To Table I:
The sample contains 44,345 datapoints for 6,408 firms for 1988-1997. The Endangered,
Indeterminate, and Good sub-samples contain 18%, 14%, and 68%, respectively, of the to-
tal firms in the sample. It/Kt-1 is the investment/capital ratio; UCt is the user cost of capital;
St is real sales in millions of Deutschmarks; CFt/Kt-1 is the cash flow/capital ratio; CWRt is
the creditworthiness ratio; ∆  is the first-difference operator. See Section II and Appendix B
for more details about the variables. The sub-sample results in columns 1-3 are sorted by
CWRt: Endangered [Good] represents those datapoints below [above] the lower [higher]
critical value of CWR; Indeterminate represents those datapoints between the two critical
values.– 18 –
Table II
OLS Parameter Estimates Of Equation (4)
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio
                              FULL                              SPLIT SAMPLE____________________
Variable           SAMPLE            Good           Differential          Good           Differential                                












































2 0.028 0.032 0.031
LM(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes To Table II:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimates in column 1 are for the full sample. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are
sorted by CWRt: Good represents coefficients for observations above the higher critical
value of CWR; Differential represents coefficients for the difference between the coeffi-
cients for Endangered and Good firms, where Endangered firms are those below the lower
critical value of CWR. Indeterminate observations have been excluded. The estimates in
columns 4 and 5 include only those regressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-
values are less than 0.10. η  measures the long-run impact of cash flow on investment; see
equation (5). LM(2) is the p-value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for second-
order autocorrelation. Section IV contains a further discussion of this statistic. A complete
set of estimated coefficients is contained in Appendix C.– 19 –
Table III
GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (4)
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio
                               FULL                                      SPLIT SAMPLE_  ________     ____
Variable               SAMPLE          Good           Differential          Good           Differential







































SH p-value 0.017 0.252 0.270
LM(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes To Table III:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The instruments are CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t), ∆ logUCi,t-m(t), and ∆ logSi,t-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is
as large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a constant and α τ
are also in the instrument set. The estimates in column 1 are for the full sample. The esti-
mates in columns 2 and 3 are sorted by CWRt: Good represents coefficients for observa-
tions above the higher critical value of CWR; Differential represents coefficients for the
difference between the coefficients for Endangered and Good firms, where Endangered
firms are those below the lower critical value of CWR. The estimates in columns 4 and 5
include only those regressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-values are less
than 0.10. η  measures the long-run impact of cash flow on investment; see equation (5).
SH is the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions. LM(2)
is the p-value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation.
Sections I and IV contain further discussion of these statistics. A complete set of estimated
coefficients is contained in Appendix C.– 20 –
Table IV
GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (4)
Augmented With Lags Of The Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio
                                FULL                                      SPLIT SAMPLE_  ________     ____
Variable               SAMPLE          Good           Differential          Good           Differential







































SH p-value 0.075 0.239 0.326
LM(2) p-value 0.165 0.132 0.042
Notes To Table IV:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The instruments are CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t), ∆ logUCi,t-m(t), ∆ logSi,t-m(t), and Ii,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for mt
> 2, where mt is as large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a
constant and α t are also in the instrument set. The estimates in column 1 are for the full
sample. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are sorted by CWRt: Good represents coeffi-
cients for observations above the higher critical value of CWR; Differential represents co-
efficients for the difference between the coefficients for Endangered and Good firms,
where Endangered firms are those below the lower critical value of CWR. Indeterminate
observations have been excluded. The estimates in columns 4 and 5 include only those re-
gressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-values are less than 0.10. η  measures
the long-run impact of cash flow on investment, and equals the formula in equation (5) di-
vided by (1-Σ  λ h), where the λ h‘s are the coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable;
standard errors are computed by the delta method. SH is the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen
statistic testing overidentifying restrictions. LM(2) is the p-value for the Lagrange Multi-
plier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation. Sections I and IV contain further
discussion of these statistics. A complete set of estimated coefficients is contained in Ap-
pendix C.– 21 –
Appendix A:  Derivations Of The Distributed Lag (DL)
And Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) Estimating Equations
This appendix contains a derivation of the DL and ADL estimating equations. The DL is a
special case of the ADL with the lags of the dependent variable suppressed. We first derive
the ADL equation, and then show how the DL follows with appropriate restrictions on the
coefficients.
The ADL takes as its starting point the demand for the desired capital stock,
k*t = σ  uc*t + ξ  s*t, (A-1)
where k*t is the log of the desired (or long-run) stock of capital, s*t is the log of desired
output measured by sales, uc*t is the log of the long-run user cost, ξ  and σ  are long-run
elasticities representing the technology, and the t subscript indexes time. For expositional
simplicity, we do not include firm-specific subscripts in this derivation. Equation (A-1)
follows from a CES production function containing capital and any number of additional
factors of production. Note that σ   is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital,
and is a key parameter in determining the strength of the interest rate channel of monetary
policy on capital formation.
The challenge facing the applied econometrician is to translate the above demand for a
stock of capital into the demand for the flow of investment. We begin this translation by
assuming that investment equals the change in the desired capital stock,
 ∆ kt = ∆ k*t,( A - 2 )
where ∆  is the first difference operator and kt is the log of the capital stock. Equation (A-2)
is not a satisfactory investment equation because it assumes that the actual capital stock
adjusts instantaneously to changes in the desired capital stock. Furthermore, k*t is unob-
servable. To derive a useful econometric specification, we introduce dynamics with three
assumptions. First, we assume that the adjustment of the actual capital stock (or the in-
vestment-capital ratio less depreciation) to its desired level is distributed over time ac-
cording to the following distributed lag,
   ∆ kt = It/Kt-1 - δ   = a(L) ∆ k*t,( A - 3 )
where a(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator representing technological constraints such
as delivery lags and other adjustment frictions.– 22 –
Second, following Jorgenson (1966), we assume that a(L)  can be approximated by a ra-
tional lag, b(L)/(1-c(L)), and rewrite (A-3) as follows,
   It/Kt-1 - δ  = b(L)/(1-c(L)) ∆ k*t,( A - 4 )
                 =  α  + b(L) ∆ k*t + c(L) It-1/Kt-2,
where α  = δ  c(1). The b(L)’s, c(L)’s, and α  contain technology parameters.
Third, at time t, one can consider the long-run values defining k*t in (A-1) as expected val-
ues based on current information. We assume that these expectations are determined by the
following univariate autoregressions specified as first differences,
∆ uc*t = duc(L) ∆ uct, (A-5a)
∆ s*t = ds(L) ∆ st, (A-5b)
where the duc(L)’s and ds(L)’s are expectation parameters whose lag lengths need not be
equal. Consequently, (A-5) provides a good reason why the length of the distributed lag for
user cost and sales variables in our investment equation may not be equal. A disadvantage
of (A-5) is that it uses a narrow information set, a point to which we return below.
Combining (A-1)-(A-5) and appending an error term (et), we obtain the following invest-
ment equation,
It/Kt-1 =  α  + σ  b(L) duc(L) ∆ uct + ξ  b(L) ds(L) ∆ st + c(L) Ι t-1/Κ t-2 + et, (A-6a)
It/Kt-1 =  α  + fuc(L) ∆ uct + fs(L) ∆ st + fΙ/Κ (L) Ι t-1/Κ t-2 + et,  (A-6b)
where fuc(L) = σ  b(L) duc(L), fs(L) = ξ  b(L) ds(L), and fΙ/Κ (L) = c(L). The f(L)’s represent
estimated coefficients, and are a mixture of technology and expectation parameters.
The long-run impacts of changes in the user cost and sales are assessed with the following
transformed set of coefficients,
η uc = fuc(1) / (1−  fΙ/Κ (1)), (A-7a)
η s = fs(1) / (1−  fΙ/Κ (1)). (A-7b)– 23 –
These long-run elasticities can have a structural interpretation in terms of the technology
parameters – σ  and ξ  – if we impose the following restrictions,
b(1) / (1-c(1)) = 1, (A-8a)
duc(1) = 1, (A-8b)
ds(1) = 1. (A-8c)
Equation (A-8a) implies that all orders for capital goods are ultimately delivered. Equations
(A-8b) and (A-8c) imply that expected values ultimately move one-for-one with changes in
actual values in the information set. Note that the validity of the η ’s as long-run elasticities
is not dependent on the validity of these assumptions used to identify the structural pa-
rameters. However, if we wish to separate technology and expectation parameters and thus,
in principle, conduct policy experiments that adhere to the strictures of the Lucas Critique,
such identification is essential. The quantitative importance of the Lucas Critique and
hence the need to achieve identification has been questioned.
The information set used to form expectations of ∆ uc*t and ∆ s*t can be expanded to in-
clude additional variables (zt’s), and (A-5) is can be generalized as follows,
∆ uc*t = duc,uc(L) ∆ uct + duc,z(L) zt,( A - 5 a ’ )
∆ s*t = ds,s(L) ∆ st + ds,z(L) zt. (A-5b’)
If the z’s are variables already appearing as arguments in the investment equation (i.e.,
∆ uct, ∆ st, and It/Kt-1), then the estimating equation is not altered,
It/Kt-1 =  α  + {σ  b(L) duc,uc(L) + ξ  b(L) ds,uc(L)}∆ uct (A-6a’)
      + {ξ  b(L) ds,s(L) + σ  b(L) duc,,s(L)} ∆ st
          +  {c(L) + σ  b(L) duc,I/K(L) + ξ  b(L) ds,I/K(L)} It-1/Kt-2  +  et,
It/Kt-1 = α   +  β uc(L) ∆ uct  +  β s(L) ∆ st  +  λ (L) It-1/Kt-2  +  et, (A-6b’)
where the β (L)’s and λ (L)’s are defined by the terms in braces in (A-6a’). In this case with
more a more general information set, identification of the σ  and ξ  technology parameters
becomes more difficult.– 24 –
The estimating equation recognizes the possibility that cash flow may also enter as an ar-
gument to capture short-term credit constraints (i.e., entering
(A-4)) and/or as an element of the information set used to form expectations of ∆ uct
and ∆ st (i.e., as another z entering (A-5)). In either case, current and lagged values of cash
flow (scaled by the lagged capital stock) enters as additional regressors. Defining the cash
flow coefficients – representing short-term credit constraints – as γ (L), we obtain the fol-
lowing equation that is the basis for all of the estimates presented in this paper,
It/Kt-1 =  α  + β uc(L) ∆ uct + β s(L) ∆ st + γ (L) CFt/Kt-1 (A-7)
                  +  λ (L) It-1/Kt-2   +  et..
The long-run impacts of user cost, sales, and cash flow are defined as follow,
η uc  =   β uc(1) / (1−  λ(1 )), (A-8a)
η s    =   β s(1) / (1−  λ(1 )), (A-8b)
η cf   =   γ (1) / (1−  λ( 1)), (A-8c)
where η uc and η s are elasticities and η cf is a semi-elasticity.
The DL model excludes the effect of lags of the dependent variable on the adjustment of
the desired capital stock (A-4) and expectations formation (A-5’). Excluding these effects
in the above derivation implies the following coefficient restrictions: C(L) = 0, duc,I/K = 0,
and ds,I/K = 0. With these restrictions, λ (L) = 0 in equation (A-7). The only differences be-
tween this restricted version of equation (A-7) and equation (4) in the text is the inclusion
of time-specific intercepts (α t) and firm-specific subscripts on α i and the variables.– 25 –
Appendix B: The Construction Of User Costs Of Capital For Germany16
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where p is the output price level, p
I is the price of investment goods, A is the present value
of depreciation allowances, ρ  is the nominal discount rate, π
I is the expected rate of in-
vestment goods price inflation, δ
e  is the economic depreciation rate, and τ  is the basic cor-
porate tax rate (the rate of tax paid if no profits are distributed). The user cost formula usu-
ally reflects investment tax credits determined as a percentage of the price of a purchased as-
set. During our sample period, no such credits were granted to German firms.
Our construction of user costs takes into account multiple assets, multiple sources of funds,
and individual taxation following the approach developed by King and Fullerton (1984),
extended by the OECD (1991) and Chenells and Griffith (1997), and applied to the German
data by Harhoff and Ramb (2001) and Ramb (2003).
If we distinguish as sources of finance between debt finance, new share issues, and retained
earnings, the respective discount rates are given by
()
  earnings   retained for           
    shares   new for   























In this expression, the variable θ measures the degree of discrimination between retentions
and distributions. It is the opportunity costs of retained earnings in terms of gross dividends
forgone; θ equals the additional dividend shareholders would receive if one unit of post-
corporate tax earnings were distributed. Furthermore, i is the nominal interest rate, m is the
                                                
16 The user cost of capital for our sample have been constructed on the basis of the computer routines provi-
ded by Fred Ramb, who also allowed us to use his tax and depreciation data. Fred's help was crucial and deci-
sive. As we made several changes, however, we have to bear responsibility for the user costs used in this
study.– 26 –
marginal personal tax rate on capital income, and z is the effective tax rate on accrued
capital gains.
Between 1977 and 2000, the system of capital income taxation operating in Germany was a
split rate system with full imputation. Shareholders who were residents of the Federal Re-
public received a tax credit in the amount of the corporation tax on distributed profits paid.
Ultimately, the tax on capital income on distributed profits was equal to the marginal tax
on capital income. For Germany, therefore, the variable θ assumes the value 1/(1-τ ). Fur-
thermore, the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains was zero, as capital gains were not
taxed after a holding period of one year or more. In this case, the expression for the dis-
count rate reduces to
()
()
() earnings   retained for           
        shares   new for        

















In the system with full imputation that prevailed in Germany from 1977 to 2000, the two
types of outside finance are equivalent (Sinn, 1984 and 1987).
To implement this framework and quantify (B-1), we use sector-specific (indexed by j)
output price levels (pj,t) and depreciation rate (δ
e
j,t). Depreciation rates are calculated from a
perpetual inventory equation for sectoral capital stocks and investment flows; rates for
1995-1997 are imputed. The price of capital goods (p
I
t) is an economy-wide deflator dated
at the beginning of the year, and the expected inflation rate (π
I
t) measures the rate of
growth of p
I
t between the beginning and the end of year t. Aa,t is the present value of depre-
ciation allowances as a firm-specific asset-weighted average for three different types of as-
sets (indexed by a): building, machinery and equipment. In each case, finance-specific dis-
count rates are used. (Aa,t is computed with an optimal switch from accelerated to straight-
line depreciation methods.) The rate of interest rate (it) is the average yield to maturity of
domestic listed debt securities. The tax rate on retained earnings is calculated as a com-
pound tax combining three different taxes of profits: the basic corporate tax on retained
earnings (τ
r
t), the local tax (Gewerbesteuer, gt, is deductible for corporate tax purposes),
and the "solidarity surcharge" (st, which is levied on all corporate and personal tax pay-
ments),
() () , 1 1 t t
r
t t t g g s + − τ + = τ  (B-4)– 27 –
As in King and Fullerton, we treat local taxes as a normal tax on profits, ignoring some of
its special features.17 As a marginal tax rate for the shareholder, we used the highest mar-
ginal income tax 
max
t m , again inflated by the solidarity surcharge,
()
max 1 t t t m s m + = .( B - 5 )
To combine the different user costs resulting from the three different sources of finance, we
use a flow weights defined for the three sources of finance as follows: debt (with total li-
abilities including the share of borrowed funds in the reserve subject to future taxation),
new shares (the first difference of the stock of subscribed capital augmented by share pre-
mium or paid-in surplus), and retained earnings (retained earnings with the earned surplus
including the share of own funds in the reserves subject to future taxation). For increases of
debt, new shares, or retained earnings, the corresponding weight is calculated as a ratio to
the sum of positive sources of new finance in that year. If a particular weight assumes a
negative value, it is set to zero for that year; in each year, the weights sum to unity. For the
first year, the respective stock weights are used.
                                                
17 Interest payments are only partly deductible, and the Gewerbesteuer payments are not credited to the
shareholders on distribution. The latter, strictly speaking, destroys the basic equivalence between sources of
outside finance. The Gewerbesteuer is raised at the local level. Due to data limitations, however, we have to
confine ourselves to the mean Gewerbesteuer rate for the whole sample.– 28 –
Appendix C:  Complete Tables of the Estimated Coefficients
Table C-II
OLS Parameter Estimates of Equation (4) - Complete Estimates
Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined by the Creditworthiness Ratio
                                 FULL       _____________    SPLIT SAMPLE_________________
. Variable               SAMPLE          Good            Differential            Good          Differential












































































































































2 0.028 0.032 0.031
LM(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000– 29 –
Notes to Table C-II:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The estimates in column 1 are for the full sample. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are
sorted by CWRt: Good represents coefficients for observations above the higher critical
value of CWR; Differential represents coefficients for the difference between the coeffi-
cients for Endangered and Good firms, where Endangered firms are those below the lower
critical value of CWR. Indeterminate observations have been excluded. The estimates in
columns 4 and 5 include only those regressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-
values are less than 0.10 (the one exception to this trimming rule is for ∆ logUCi,t which has
been included in columns 4 and 5 to preserve the continuity of the distributed lag). η X
measures the long-run impact of X (X={CF/K, ∆ logUC, ∆ logS}) on investment; see equa-
tion (5). (Note that the η  in Table II is equivalent to the η cf in Table C-II.) LM(2) is the p-
value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation. Section
IV contains a further discussion of this statistic.– 30 –
Table C-III
GMM Parameter Estimates of Equation (4) - Complete Estimates
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined by the Creditworthiness Ratio
                              FULL                                          SPLIT SAMPLE                            .
Variable               SAMPLE           Good           Differential           Good           Differential



































































































































SH p-value 0.017 0.252 0.270
LM(2) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000– 31 –
Notes to Table C-III:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The instruments are CFi,t-m/Ki,t-1-m, ∆ logUCi,t-m, and ∆ logSi,t-m for mt > 2, where mt is as
large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a constant and α t are
also in the instrument set.   The estimates in column 1 are for the full sample. The estimates
in columns 2 and 3 are sorted by CWRt: Good represents coefficients for observations
above the higher critical value of CWR; Differential represents coefficients for the differ-
ence between the coefficients for Endangered and Good firms, where Endangered firms are
those below the lower critical value of CWR. The estimates in columns 4 and 5 include
only those regressors in columns 2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-values are less than 0.10.
η X measures the long-run impact of X (X={CF/K, ∆ logUC, ∆ logS}) on investment; see
equation (5). (Note that the η  in Table III is equivalent to the η cf in Table C-III). SH is the
p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions. LM(2) is the p-
value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation. Sections
I and IV contain further discussion of these statistics.– 32 –
Table C-IV
GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (4)
Augmented With Lags Of The Dependent Variable - Complete Estimates
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio
                                FULL                                          SPLIT SAMPLE                            .
Variable               SAMPLE           Good          Differential            Good           Differential


































































































































  (0.126)– 33 –
Table C-IV (continued)
GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (4)
Augmented With Lags Of The Dependent Variable - Complete Estimates
Dependent Variable: It / Kt-1
Split Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio
                                FULL                                          SPLIT SAMPLE                                .
 Variable             SAMPLE           Good           Differential            Good          Differential

































SH p-value 0.075 0.239 0.326
LM(2) p-value 0.165 0.132 0.042
Notes to Table C-IV:
See the note to Table I for variable definitions. Firm-specific (α i) and time-specific (α t) in-
tercepts are also included in the regression equation. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The instruments are CFi,t-m/Ki,t-1-m, ∆ logUCi,t-m, ∆ logSi,t-m, and Ii,t-m/Ki,t-1-m for mt > 2, where
mt is as large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a constant
and α t are also in the instrument set.   The estimates in column 1 are for the full sample. The
estimates in columns 2 and 3 are sorted by CWRt: Good represents coefficients for obser-
vations above the higher critical value of CWR; Differential represents coefficients for the
difference between the coefficients for Endangered and Good firms, where Endangered
firms are those below the lower critical value of CWR. Indeterminate observations have
been excluded. The estimates in columns 4 and 5 include only those regressors in columns
2 or 3 with t-statistics whose p-values are less than 0.10. η X measures the long-run impact
of X (X={CF/K, ∆ logUC, ∆ logS}) on investment, and equals the formula in equation (5)
divided by (1-Σ  λ h), where the λ h‘s are the coefficients on the lags of the dependent vari-
able; standard errors are computed by the delta method. (Note that the η  in Table IV is
equivalent to the η cf in Table C-IV). SH is the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic test-
ing overidentifying restrictions. LM(2) is the p-value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic
testing for second-order autocorrelation. Sections I and IV contain further discussion of
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